Leibniz’s Monadology (1714) is anything but a cosy, Sunday-afternoon read. We know Bertrand Russell was an avid reader of Leibniz’s work and its exegesis. Russell even wrote a book on it, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (1900). We know that. We know that and we cannot understand why. Leibniz's writing is callous and it is frustrating.
Nevertheless, here and there we find a piece of argumentation. And argumentation in those days was a hot bowl full of spaghetti with more geometrico, thank you. For instance, in order to prove that the world is made out of teeny-tiny souls – “monads” – which receive unique and infinite understanding from God, he went as follows.
First, two postulates:
I. Every substance is either simple or compound.
II. A compound substance is composed of simple substances.
Nice. But let one not be fooled by simplicity. These be starting points treacherous and deluding! Anyway, a conclusion certainly follows.
III. Every substance is either simple or composed of simple substances.
We then lay down two additional postulates:
IV. Each material substance has a divisible extension.
Has a what? An extension of a substance is, in Descartes’ terminology, is the amount of space matter occupies. Let it be said that, by borrowing this scholastic concept, Descartes was perfectly mudded in an old medieval metaphysics as to the distinction between mind and matter (intension and extension). But be it. The next postulate is:
V. Nothing that has a divisible extension is a simple substance.
Exactly, right? Because it is a divisible extension. But take III, IV & V, and state it clearly so that Russell can hear you:
VI. No simple substance is a material substance.
And, if not material, we know what’s left:
VII. Every substance is either material or spiritual
Hence,
VIII. Each simple substance is spiritual.
Good night!
PS: For those sufficiently sadistisch, check the Monadology for why every monad is a perceiving being!
Here is Kant's argumentation about simple and composed substances (the second 'Antinomy of Pure Reason') in wich he proceeds with other method (reductium ad absurdum):
ReplyDelete1.
Supose no compound substance is composed of simple substances.
So, if we divide it, we will never reach to simple substances. But then it would not stand because the division would end in nothing, in which case no substance could have been given (here we have the contradiction with our assumption).
Hence, either it is not possible to divide a compound substance, or it's division must reach to a simple one.
But the first alternative must be rejected because in that case the compound substance would not be substance, which can not be addmited. Then: every compound substance is composed of simple substances (this is the thesis).
2.
Now supose that every compound substance is composed of simple substances. As there is not anything (composed) not spatial, the
compound substance must ocupy some space. But the space is not composed of simple parts but of spaces. So, each part of the compund substance ocupy some space. But every thing in the space is as divisible as the space it fits. Hence, the suposed simple parts of the compund substance must be spatial, and then be divisible. So, the simple substance is divisible, which is contradictory.
Then: there is nothings in the world composed of simple substance nor simple substances at all (the antithesis).
PS:(may be the comment is not well written because english is not my language; as I couldn't know if it is right or not, I publish it as it is)
A, this is even better!
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